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Note
AquAdvantage is Not Real Advantage: European
Biotechnology Regulations and the United States’
September 2010 FDA Review of Genetically
Modified Salmon
Katherine Wilinska*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have brought an increase in public concern over
genetically modified (GM) organisms and their possible impact on the
health and safety of consumers and the environment. GM food supporters
revere the enhanced quality and taste, increased yield, lower production
costs, heightened pest and drought resistance, and shorter production times
of transgenic foods. However, opponents fear the yet unknown
environmental, social, health, and ethical risks that these foods bring with
them.1 The divided views are, to different extents, reflected in the
divergent regulation of GM foods in the United States and the European
Union.2
* Katherine Wilinska holds an MA in English from A. Mickiewicz University in Poland
and is expected to graduate with a JD from the University of Minnesota Law School in
December 2011. She has spent her last semester of law school studying European Union
law at the Bocconi University in Milan, Italy. In the past she has worked as a manager for
an international business and as a Polish interpreter. Her areas of research include corporate
law, antitrust law, biotechnology regulation, and international business and trade law with a
special focus on cross-comparison of United States and European Union law.
1. See MARK A. POLLACK & GREGORY C. SHAFFER, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS:
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS 34–38
(2009) (listing such positives to GM organisms’ development as the prevention of hunger
in developing countries, the clean-up of toxic spills, and the elimination of toxic chemicals
from crop production; whereas some negatives include the impairment of biodiversity,
irreversible changes to the natural food chain, the triggering of allergenic reactions, and even
a monopoly of modified products concentrated in a few corporate hands); Simonetta Zarilli,
International Trade in GMOs and GM Products: National and Multilateral Legal
Frameworks, at 1–2, UNCTAD/ITCD/TAB/30, U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.D.41 (2005)
(contrasting the benefits of GM foods in resolving issues such as the nutritional needs of the
world’s growing population and the efficient use of agrarian space with possible negative
impacts on human health and the environment).
2. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 7 (“In both the US and the EU [the
differences in the regulations] remain unchanged in their fundamental approaches.”).
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September 2010 brought a new wave of public debate when the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) held hearings on the possible
approval of a genetically modified fish, AquAdvantage Salmon (AAS), for
public consumption.3 Aqua Bounty Technologies, Inc. (ABT) maintains
that the product is safe for consumption and poses little environmental risk,
but consumer and environmental groups disagree and point out the lack of
effective risk assessment methods with respect to GM animals, as no other
such animal has been approved for human consumption.4 While the
controversy centers around the review’s precedential value,5 the unknown
health risks, and a serious environmental concern if AAS escape into the
wild,6 there is also a more complex impact on the U.S.-E.U. salmon trade
and international laws because ABT intends to sell AAS eggs
commercially to farmers.7
This Note will examine the possible consequences of FDA approval
of AAS for mass consumption. Part II will discuss the ABT application
packet (the Packet), the social perception and regulation of GM foods in
both the United States and the European Union, and relevant international
agreements. Part III will analyze AAS environmental assessment, the
review’s possible impact on international trade and international laws, and
the sufficiency of ABT research. It will propose trade-friendly legislative
solutions, uniform labeling within a new statutory regime, and stricter
research requirements in the submission process. Overall, this Note argues
that relevant congressional action is overdue, and the FDA should not
approve AAS at this time. American GM foods’ marketability in the
international trade arena requires new laws consistent with the labeling,
tracing, and monitoring requirements of other nations in order to protect
the environment and maintain overall consumer trust.

3. Lyndsey Layton, FDA Hears Concerns over Approving Genetically Modified
Salmon, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/09/20/AR2010092005967.html (reporting that Aqua Bounty
Technologies, Inc., a company that spent the last fifteen years developing superior qualities
in Atlantic salmon, is now seeking a green light to start massive production of the fish for
sale to the public).
4. See Kim Geiger, Genetically Modified Salmon Safe to Eat, FDA Report Says, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/04/nation/la-na-fda-salmon20100904-15;
Susan Heavey, Biotech Salmon Faces Scrutiny at FDA Panel, REUTERS, Sept. 20, 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/20/us-fda-biotech-salmonidUSTRE68J0EZ20100920 (discussing the rising public concern about GM salmon safety).
5. Other GM animals await similar approvals including environmentally friendly
manure producing pigs and mad cow disease resistant cattle. If and when the FDA approves
AAS, such companies will proceed with their approval petitions. ABT itself hopes to
approve its own GM tilapia and trout in the future. See Heavey, supra note 4.
6. PETER COATES, SALMON 104 (2006) (explaining that wild salmon populations
would be negatively affected by any genetically superior species).
7. See Heavey, supra note 4; Geiger, supra note 4.
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II. BACKGROUND
GM organisms have been genetically altered8 to obtain certain
desirable traits, such as drought resistance in plants and virus resistance or
accelerated growth in animals.9 In the United States, the FDA, which has
statutory and regulatory authority over genetically modified foods,10
defines GM animals as animals altered by recombinant DNA (rDNA).11 In
addition, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provide oversight for GM crop
planting and its impact on the environment and food safety.12 The three
agencies constitute the Coordinated Framework13 responsible for
regulation and oversight of GM plants and animals.
European legislation defines a genetically modified organism as “one
in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur
naturally by mating and/or natural recombination.”14 In Europe, GMrelated regulation is not effectuated by governmental agencies; instead, it
arises from the interaction between E.U. government bodies such as the
8. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 9 (defining genetic engineering as a
process in which genes from one organism are isolated, manipulated in a laboratory and
injected into another organism).
9. See What are Genetically Modified (GM) Foods?, HUMAN GENOME PROJECT
INFORMATION
(last
updated
Nov.
5,
2008),
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/gmfood.shtml (listing other
possible names for living organisms whose genetic traits have been modified to obtain
desirable traits such as “genetically modified,” “genetically engineered,” or “transgenic”).
10. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 10 (noting that agencies regulate GM
plants in terms of the final products’ characteristics—not in terms of the production process).
11. See CTR. FOR VETERINARY MED., FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS CONTAINING
HERITABLE RECOMBINANT DNA CONSTRUCTS 3 (2009) [hereinafter REGULATION OF
GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED
ANIMALS]
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/Guid
anceforIndustry/UCM113903.pdf (defining genetically modified or engineered animals as
those whose DNA has been injected with parts of DNA from another animal which
possessed certain desirable traits like resistance to viruses or cold temperatures, thus
producing a “recombinant DNA”).
12. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 10.
13. See generally Margaret Rosso Grossman, Genetically Modified Crops and Food
in the United States: The Federal Regulatory Framework, State measures, and Liability in
Tort, in THE REGULATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS: COMPARATIVE
APPROACHES 299, 300 (Luc Bodiguel & Michael Cardwell eds., 2010); POLLACK &
SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 46; Antonia Eliason, Science versus Law in WTO Jurisprudence:
The (Mis)Interpretation of the Scientific Process and the (In)Sufficiency of Scientific
Evidence in EC-Biotech, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 341, 370 (2009); Valery Federici,
Note, Genetically Modified Food and Informed Consumer Choice: Comparing U.S. and
E.U. Labeling Laws, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 515, 538 (2010); David E. Sella-Villa, Gently
Modified Operations: How Environmental Concerns Addressed Through Customs
Procedures Can Successfully Resolve the US-EU GMO Dispute, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL
L. & POL’Y REV. 971 (2009).
14. Council Directive 2001/18, art. 2(2), 2001 O.J. (L 160) 4 (EC).
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European Commission, European Parliament, and relevant authorities in
each of the member states.15 Those bodies are collectively referred to as
the Community Framework.16
AAS falls under both the U.S. and E.U. GM definitions. Its genetic
code has been altered by injecting the Chinook salmon growth hormone,
which promotes growth by stimulating the thyroid, and the ocean pout
antifreeze protein, which enables the salmon to survive in near freezing
temperatures.17 The FDA is reviewing AAS under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act18 (FFDCA) and its New Animal Drug Application19
(NADA) as a “new animal drug” intended for use in animals20 in
accordance with its 2009 Guidance for Industry 187, created to streamline
the GM animal application process.21 NADA triggers environmental
analysis under the Code of Federal Regulations Title 21,22 the
environmental impact statement (EIS),23 and the FDA examination of
environmental impacts of GM animals24 including inadvertent release or
escape.
A. ABT’S APPLICATION PACKET, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, AND
WEBSITE
The Packet submitted for FDA review to the Center for Veterinary
Medicine (CVM) contains publicly accessible information on the AAS
health and environmental risk assessment.25 The submission is a result of
fourteen year research and sixty million dollar development efforts by
ABT.26 ABT plans to produce eggs in its facilities in Canada, to grow-out

15. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 10.
16. Id. at 60.
17. VETERINARY MEDICINE ADVISORY COMM., FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. CTR. FOR
VETERINARY MED., BRIEFING PACKET: AQUADVANTAGE SALMON 65 (2010)
[hereinafter THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET], available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMater
ials/VeterinaryMedicineAdvisoryCommittee/UCM224762.pdf.
18. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399a (2006).
19. Id. § 512, 21 U.S.C. § 360b(a)(1).
20. Id. § 201, 21 U.S.C. § 321(v).
21. See REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS, supra note 11.
22. 21 C.F.R. § 25 (2011) (requiring an environmental impact statement (EIS) in
extraordinary circumstances under § 25.21 when there is a potential for serious harm to the
environment and the action adversely affects endangered species).
23. See REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS, supra note 11, at 19,
25 (requiring an EIS until the FDA has more experience in processing applications for GM
animals).
24. Id. at 12.
25. See THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17.
26. Geiger, supra note 4.
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the fish in Panama,27 and to license AAS eggs to fish farmers.28 In
assessing the risks, ABT used 144 market-sized salmon to measure their
food safety.29 The report states that AAS contains ocean pout antifreeze
protein to increase resistance to freezing temperatures and Chinook salmon
growth hormone to promote growth and increased levels of allergens.30
AAS grows several times bigger than and twice as fast as wild salmon and
the Packet claims that “adequate containment measures appear to be in
place” to insure a “low probability of escape.”31 Nevertheless, the
possibility of escape does exist because “no single containment measure
can be assured to be 100% effective.”32 Furthermore, despite AAS’s
“extremely small” survival likelihood,33 subsistence is possible because
“up to 5%” of females are not sterile.34 In light of data insufficiency, ABT
“conservatively assumed that older life stages . . . would survive if they
escape containment” but that “there are no likely consequences on the
U.S., foreign nations not participating in the action, or on the global
commons
as
a
result
of
applicable
reproductive
and
geographic/geophysical confinement.”35
ABT submitted a separate Environmental Assessment (EA) to the
CVM36 pursuant to NADA’s requirement of showing that the “new animal
drug” is safe and effective for its intended use.37 The EA states that the
AAS trans-gene will not mutate into unknown forms,38 even though wild
salmon undergo genetic change in response to different environmental
conditions.39 Further, research shows that at an escape rate of 1%,
traditional farm-raised salmon escapees interbreed with wild salmon,
compete for food, and disrupt the ecosystem.40 However, AAS will be
farmed in land based facilities with redundant containment measures.41
27. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 65.
28. See Heavey, supra note 4; Geiger, supra note 4; AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES
INC., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR AQUADVANTAGE SALMON 41 (Aug. 25, 2010),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Veteri
naryMedicineAdvisoryCommittee/UCM224760.pdf.
29. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 86.
30. Id. at 65, 75.
31. Id. at 131.
32. Id. at 116.
33. Id. at 116, 130.
34. Id. at 115, 127.
35. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 130.
36. AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28.
37. See REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS, supra note 11, at 13;
see also AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28, at 14 (informing that NADA
approval triggers environmental assessment).
38. AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28, at 19.
39. Id. at 21.
40. Id. at 30.
41. Id. at 43, 54.
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These will be in areas where no natural disasters have occurred.42 At the
same time, relevant research on salmon shows that a mere 25% size
advantage is enough to push smaller fish away from feeding and mating
grounds.43 Thus, one can presume that AAS, which has a significant size
advantage over its natural cousin, could decimate the natural salmon
population.
The ABT’s website assures the public that AAS has no mating
advantage, would not alter native salmon populations, is 100% sterile, and
has undergone adequate environmental assessment.44 Further, no
antifreeze or growth hormones will be passed on to the consumers,
adequate federal laws are in place, and the FDA has sufficient expertise to
approve the transgenic fish.45
The FDA accepted public comments on the approval until November
22, 2010.46 At the time of this publication, the FDA has not issued a
conclusive decision, but Congress voted in June 2011 to prohibit the FDA
from approving GM salmon.47 The general concerns were a hasty approval
process and insufficient review of impact on the health of American
consumers and the environment.
B. GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, genetically modified foods have enjoyed greater
consumer tolerance, a more lenient regulatory framework, and easier
approval process due to an assumption that the new genetic varieties are
not harmful unless evidence indicates the contrary.
1. Consumer Tolerance of Genetic Modification
American consumers have historically been more tolerant of GM
foods and have not demanded harsher laws regulating their proliferation

42. Id. at 53.
43. Id. at 35.
44. See
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
AQUABOUNTY.COM,
http://www.aquabounty.com/technology/faq-297.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2011) (“Q. Can
we be sure that AAS will really be sterile? A. Yes”).
45. Id.
46. FDA to Convene Public Hearing on the Labeling of Food Made from
AquAdvantage
Salmon,
FDA
(Aug.
25,
2010),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/NewsEvents/ConstituentUpdates/ucm222601.htm.
47. Press Release, Center for Food Safety, U.S. House of Representatives Passes
Amendment to Prohibit Genetically Engineered Salmon Approval (June 16, 2011),
available at http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/2011/06/16/u-s-house-of-representativespasses-amendment-to-prohibit-genetically-engineered-salmon-approval/ (providing that in
the H.R. 2112, Agriculture, Rural, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 2012, the House of Representatives asserted its discretionary budget
authority).
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on the market,48 although that position appears to be changing.49 The
United States began its biotechnological developments with caution.
However, a more liberal approach has evolved regarding the use of genetic
modifications for enhancement50 with an active engagement in promotion
since the 1970s. In 1999, upwards of 60% of grocery store foods were
grown from genetically modified seeds, a fact of which only 33% of
Americans were aware.51 By 2007, approximately 89% of soybeans and
61% of corn grown in the United States had been genetically modified.52
Yet, recent trends illustrate that when American consumers are asked
directly if they would like to know whether their food is genetically
modified, 94% say yes.53 There is also growing pressure for change in the
regulation of GM foods, which is manifested by commercial adaptation,
political mobilization, and policy change.54 Combining the ubiquity of
genetic modification and the growing desire of public opinion that
modified food be labeled before it can be sold; it is somewhat surprising
that approval of new GM foods for production in the United States is
relatively simple.
2. The Equivalence Principle: Safe until Proven Otherwise
The U.S. approval system operates in accordance with a risk-based
outlook: the equivalence principle.55 This principle allows approval of new
48. See Heavey, supra note 4; Luc Bodiguel & Michael Cardwell, Genetically
Modified Organisms and the Public: Participation, Preferences, and Protest, in THE
REGULATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES,
supra note 13, at 11, 23.
49. Bodiguel & Cardwell, supra note 48, at 23.
50. Diahanna Lynch & David Vogel, The Regulation of GMOs in Europe and the
United States: A Case-Study of Contemporary European Regulatory Politics, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
(Apr.
5,
2001),
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8688/regulation_of_gmos_in_europe_and_the_united_state
s.html.
51. Id.; see also POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 266–67 (revealing that most
recent polls indicate a number as low as 26%); Grossman, supra note 13, at 299.
52. POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 1 (listing other GM foods such as canola,
potatoes, tomatoes, papaya, squash and sunflowers).
53. Federici attributes the desire for labels as a result of the popular fear of the
unknown and points out that most consumers are “against eating GM food despite
inadvertently having already made it part of their daily diets.” Federici, supra note 13, at
522; see also Bodiguel & Cardwell, supra note 48, at 12 (revealing that a majority would
appear unhappy with Government policy that consisted of not labeling GM products).
54. While commercial adaptation results from the voluntary compliance of the United
States with E.U. regulations to gain access to E.U. markets, political mobilization results
from consumer interest groups advocating for stronger regulations. Yet further policy
change results from the United States protecting both the market and its consumers. See
POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 25–26.
55. See Grossman, supra note 13, at 300; POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 50;
Franz Xaver Perrez, Risk Regulation, Precaution and Trade, in GENETIC ENGINEERING AND
THE WORLD TRADE SYSTEM: WORLD TRADE FORUM 246, 251 (Daniel Wüger & Thomas
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products that are substantially equivalent to natural ones in the absence of
significant adverse effects on production and consumption.56 This
approach is meant to ensure “easy and reliable access to foreign markets
for their biotechnology exports.”57 In other words, the introduction of GM
foods, which are considered equivalent to their natural counterparts, into
the U.S. food industry, is governed by free market principles. In light of
the equivalence concept, the U.S. legislature puts complete trust in
scientific research and delegates approval tasks to government agencies
that safeguard public health and the environment under the Coordinated
Framework.58 In spite of the presumed equivalence approach, and in
response to growing consumer demands, the FDA has recently released
guidelines on voluntary labeling of GM products.59 Although AAS’s EA
mentions labeling for transport from Canada to Panama,60 and the Packet
mentions containment requirement labels,61 there is no note of actual
consumer product labeling once AAS reaches market shelves. However,
the FDA could exercise its discretion to require such labels under the
Guidance for Industry.62
3. Less Restrictive Laws
In general, the United States has less pronounced federal legislation
on GM foods than the European Union63 and does not require its regulatory
Cottier eds., 2008); Eliason, supra note 13, at 349, 365; Federici, supra note 13, at 534–36;
Melissa Ince & Meredith Mariani, The EU, the United States, and the GMO Dispute: Ten
Years and Counting, AGRIC. MGMT. COMMITTEE NEWSL. (A.B.A. Section of Env’t, Energy,
and Res.), Apr. 2008, at 15, 16; Sella-Villa, supra note 13, at 971; Debra M. Strauss, Feast
or Famine: The Impact of the WTO Decision Favoring the U.S. Biotechnology Industry in
the E.U. Ban of Genetically Modified Foods, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 775, 780, 784 (2008); Zarilli,
supra note 1, at 4.
56. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 46 (explaining that substantially
equivalent products are those which are “not inherently risky” and may be regulated under
existing statutes); see also Bernd van der Meulen, Regulating GM Food: Three Levels,
Three Issues, in THE REGULATORY CHALLENGE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 139, 153 (Han
Somsen ed., 2007) (revealing that the U.S. approach looks at the absence of risk and that
European authorities weren’t able to refute the evidence presented by the United States that
there were no risks).
57. See Zarilli, supra note 1, at 45.
58. Bodiguel & Cardwell, supra note 48, at 17; Sella-Villa, supra note 13, at 972–73.
59. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 50, 268; Grossman, supra note 13, at
317 (“Because consumers may be interested in whether food has been genetically modified,
the agency developed a guidance to help industry ensure that voluntary labeling is truthful
and does not mislead consumers.”).
60. See AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28, at 48.
61. See THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 47.
62. See REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS, supra note 11, at 7
(“[I]n certain circumstances . . . we intend to exercise enforcement discretion . . . .”); id. at
15 (recommending labeling for a new animal drug “throughout all stages of its lifecycle”).
63. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 268 (“[I]n the absence of . . . any federal
legislation specifically dedicated to the regulation of genetically engineered products, the
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agencies to impose labeling restrictions or tracing requirements.64 GM
products are handled within the 1986 Coordinated Framework designed to
ensure “safety of foods and food ingredients from new plant varieties.”65
The FDA is the body responsible for approvals of GM foods66 and looks
at the final consumer product for its equivalence properties, not the
process67 of producing the item.68
In approving GM foods, the FDA looks only at research information
provided by the applicant and does not conduct its own independent
research,69 although it does invite public comments.70 Each applicant must
prepare an extensive briefing packet with a product description,
consumption and environmental hazard assessment, and claim
validations.71 For example, the ABT application came in a 180 page packet
with information required by Industry Guideline 187, under which
labeling, tracing, or monitoring of GM products is not mandatory.72 Critics
worry that the FDA neglects the wider impact of the new technology.73
The FDA uses section 201(g), the new animal provision, of the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) for approving GM
animals.74 This section defines drugs as “articles (other than food) intended
to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other

FDA and the USDA conducted hearings . . . .”); Strauss, supra note 55, at 780–81 (“Since
the development of GM foods, no federal legislation has been enacted, nor have regulatory
agencies required any labeling or special approval of these substances in the United
States.”).
64. See Strauss, supra note 55, at 781 (acknowledging that regulatory agencies in the
United States do not require any labeling or special approval of GM substances).
65. See Grossman, supra note 13, at 311.
66. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 10 (noting that the FDA makes
approvals, while the EPA and USDA have oversight duties within the Coordinated
Framework).
67. POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 277.
68. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIELD TESTING GENETICALLY MODIFIED
ORGANISMS: FRAMEWORK FOR DECISIONS 14 (1989) (“[T]he product of the genetic
modification and selection should be the primary focus for making decisions about the
environmental introduction of a plant or microorganism and not the process by which the
products were obtained.”) (original emphasis); Federici, supra note 13, at 537.
69. See Grossman, supra note 13, at 312–13; Sella-Villa, supra note 13, at 973.
70. Bodiguel & Cardwell, supra note 48, at 17.
71. See generally REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS, supra note
11.
72. See generally THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17.
73. Martin D. Smith et al., Genetically Modified Salmon and Full Impact Assessment,
330 SCI. 1052, 1052 (2010) (“Although comparing health information for GM and non-GM
salmon is essential, quantifying risks in this manner implicitly (and implausibly) assumes
that the new product will simply replace the old one in the market and that the new product
leads to no changes in aggregate market prices and quantities.”).
74. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) § 201, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C)
(2006); POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 44.
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animals.”75 The FDA justifies its authority to regulate GM animals under
this statute because, “the rDNA construct in a G[M] animal that is intended
to affect the structure or function of the body of the G[M] animal,
regardless of the intended use of products that may be produced by the
G[M] animal, meets the FFDCA drug definition.”76 In other words, it is
the rDNA construct and not the whole animal that qualifies as the statutory
drug. In its 2009 Guidance for Industry, the FDA reiterated its authority
under the FFDCA and did not mention any other statute referring to GM
animals. The absence of current federal statutes77 on GM foods led to
failed FFDCA amendment efforts by members of Congress who proposed
mandatory labeling of genetically engineered material.78 As of today,
GM/GM-free labeling in the United States is still voluntary.
C. GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Europeans disfavor GM foods and E.U. legislation operates on the
precautionary assumption that such foods are harmful unless evidence
indicates to the contrary. This view constitutes an ideological and political
basis for any trade conflict related to GM foods.
1. Consumer (In)Tolerance
Historically, genetic research and the development of GM foods has
been the subject of hot debate and vehement resistance in Europe.79
European consumers have relatively low tolerance for GM foods’ presence
in their lives,80 and European public opinion is far more mobilized over
GM foods than that of the United States.81 Contrary to American
consumers, European consumers express deep skepticism about the low
environmental impact of GM foods and exhibit a lack of trust in their
governments’ food safety regulations.82 Europeans also express more
skeptical attitudes towards the “human health and safety issues associated
with GM food products.”83 Although GM food opposition differs from
75. FFDCA § 201, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C).
76. REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS, supra note 11, at 6.
77. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 51 (explaining that although there is no
per se federal statute regulating genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and GM foods, the
practical result is the mix of “the definition of regulatory authority and the agencies’ risk
assessment of GM products.”).
78. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 268, 272; Federici, supra note 13, at
535–36.
79. See Federici, supra note 13, at 516 (declaring that substances have been “hotly
debated and strongly resisted in Europe”).
80. Id.
81. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 70, 79. In addition, because GM
agriculture was not embraced by E.U. farmers from the very beginning, it never became an
important point for agricultural lobbyists who could fight for GM friendly laws. See id.
82. Sella-Villa, supra note 13, at 973.
83. See Strauss, supra note 55, at 780 (acknowledging that regulatory agencies in the
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country to country, Europeans are generally skeptical of GM foods,
perceiving them as not useful and more dangerous.84
2. The Precautionary Principle: Unsafe until Proven Otherwise
The European Union, contrary to the U.S.-endorsed risk-benefit
equivalence principle, is influenced by the precautionary principle. This
principle assumes that new technology is not safe until proven so by
extensive scientific research; thus, the European Union guards its markets
against the unknown and undesirable effects of GM plants, organisms, and
foods.85 The E.U. legislature “err[s] on the side of caution, even in the
absence of any demonstrable risk,” and excludes any potential benefits
from its analysis.86 A GM applicant must demonstrate the safety and lack
of harm of each individual product before the European Union will
consider allowing the products to be marketed within its borders.87
3. Stricter E.U. Laws
Under the Community Framework,88 the E.U. government consent
bodies impose strict requirements on parties seeking approval of
genetically modified products.89 Before a modified product can be
approved, the relevant body looks not only at the research and risk
assessment information in the petitioner’s application packet, but, unlike
the U.S. agencies, also requires an independent research assessment by a
separate designated agency.90 In addition, as a prerequisite for placing a
United States do not require any labeling or special approval of GM substances).
84. See Federici, supra note 13, at 542.
85. See Sella-Villa, supra note 13, at 976. One of the known negative impacts of
GMOs on the environment is that GM plants, once comingled with natural species,
undermine the natural plants’ genetic integrity. See id. Due to their increased resilience to
drought, viruses, and other destructive elements, they tend to completely and irreversibly
replace the natural species and reduce biodiversity. See id.
86. Federici, supra note 13, at 536.
87. See, e.g., Zarilli, supra note 1, at 10.
88. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 60 (stating that the Community
Framework is counterpart to the Coordinated Framework in the United States).
89. For an overview of E.U. regulation of the GM-matter, see DAMIEN PLAN & GUY
VAN DEN EEDE, THE E.U. LEGISLATION ON GMOS: AN OVERVIEW (2010), available at
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/111111111/14655/1/reqno_jrc572
23_2010-08-12_eu_gmo_legislation_report_final.pdf%5B1%5D.pdf.
90. See id. at 6 (identifying the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) as an
independent body of scientists which conducts the evaluation of potential consequences and
adverse effects, determines overall risks, and applies management strategies for risks); see
also REECE WALTERS, ECO CRIME AND GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD 100 (2011)
(explaining that, in the UK, safety assessments are done by the independent Advisory
Committee on Novel Foods and Processes (ACNFP)). A successful petitioner is then
burdened with periodic monitoring of risks and assessments and subject to a possible
revocation of approval if risks and dangers are uncovered that were not known at approval.
See id. These burdensome procedures effectively discourage GM developers from licensing.
See id.
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product on the market, the laws require mandatory labeling and
traceability, post-market monitoring measures, and mandatory public
disclosure including public registers.91 Furthermore, exports of GM foods
from the European Union require the recipient’s consent, states must
implement coexistence measures to avoid unintended presence of GM
crops, any deliberate release and import into the European Union occurs
upon strict review, and the producers must clearly label all GM products
and trace their GM content.92 Under this framework, GM food is approved
separately by each Member State, and the deliberate release authorization
is valid for no more than ten years subject to renewal.93 Moreover, the
“safeguard clause” allows an individual Member State to restrict or
prohibit GM plants or foods within its territory, provided the restriction is
based on a “justifiable reason” that an approved product poses a risk to
human health or the environment.94 Lastly, some E.U. states petitioned for
an additional “opt-out” provision from all “economic legislation and
agreements that would require all 27 E.U. countries to trade in GM
foodstuffs.”95
D. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
While the United States and the European Union operate on such
diverse principles with regards to GM regulation, they interact in the

91. See Directive 2001/18, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March
2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms
and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1, 8–9 (permitting each
member state the use of a “safeguard” to prevent unwanted GM product entry into its
territory).
92. See Regulation 1946/2003, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
July 2003 on Transboundary Movements of Genetically Modified Organisms, 2003 O.J. (L
287) 1, 3–4 (stating that exports of GM foods require the E.U. recipient’s consent);
Regulation No. 1830/2003, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September
2003 Concerning the Traceability and Labelling [sic] of Genetically Modified Organisms
and the Traceability of Food and Feed Products Produced from Genetically Modified
Organisms and Amending Directive 2001/18/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 24, 24 (traceability and
labeling); Directive 2001/18, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March
2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms
and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1, 5–6 (deliberate release
and import into the European Union); Council Directive 2000/29, of 8 May 2000 on
Protective Measures Against the Introduction into the Community of Organisms Harmful to
Plants or Plant Products and Against Their Spread Within the Community, 2000 O.J. (L
169) 1, 7 (revealing special authorization measures to avoid unintended presence of GM
organisms).
93. Directive 2001/18, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March
2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms
and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1, 10.
94. Id. at 13; see also POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 62; Jonathan Adler, More
Sorry Than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary Principle and the Proposed International
Safety Protocol, 35 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 173, 185 (2000).
95. WALTERS, supra note 90, at 55 (citation omitted).
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international trade arena and are subject to international agreements. This
has led to several trade conflicts that could emerge again if AAS is sold in
the European Union.
1. WTO’s Free Trade Approach to GM Foods
Although both the United States and the E.U. member states are
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), their approaches to
GM foods and organisms differ because the European Union has
additional obligations under the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol (CBP),
wherein the main objective is preservation of biodiversity by limiting GM
plant and animal presence.96 However, the free-trade-friendly and WTOcompatible U.S. approach does not aspire to limit movement of GM foods,
but rather seeks trade-friendly solutions in proscribing rules on how to
produce, classify, transport, and market them.97 For example, one
agreement ensures that product requirements and procedures that are used
to assess compliance with those requirements do not create unnecessary
obstacles to trade.98 In spite of its focus on promotion of free trade, the
WTO framework does permit measures “necessary for the protection of
the environment and the human health,” provided the measures are not
arbitrary or discriminatory.99
2. CBP’s Pro-Biodiversity Approach
The United Nations (UN) initiated the CBP,100 which comports with
the E.U. precautionary principle,101 by tolerating free trade only when no
threats to biodiversity exist.102 In fact, CBP will only promote international
trade if transporting of genetically modified matter employs adequate
biodiversity protections.103 This is achieved by establishing rules and
procedures for the safe transfer, handling, and use of GM plants and

96. SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, CARTAGENA
PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY RATIFICATION LIST 2 (Sept. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.cbd.int/doc/lists/cpb-ratifications.pdf (listing the European Union as party to the
CBP, exemplifying their obligation to ensure safe transportation of GE animals to protect
biodiversity).
97. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 2, ¶ 1, adopted on Jan. 1, 1980,
31 U.S.T. 405, 1186 U.N.T.S. 276 (“[Members] shall likewise ensure that neither technical
regulations nor standards themselves nor their application have the effect of creating
unnecessary obstacles to international trade.”).
98. Id.
99. Perrez, supra note 55, at 267.
100. Sella-Villa, supra note 13, at 978–79 (stating that the UN-initiated CBP focuses
on establishing stricter transport, transfer, and handling procedures that will significantly
limit free movement of GMOs to protect biodiversity existing within the states’ territories).
101. See id. at 972.
102. See id. at 979.
103. See Zarilli, supra note 1, at 29–30.
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animals, with a specific focus on trans-boundary movements.104 The CBP
also considers possible risks to human health.105 CBP members have
access to a web-based information system to assess their GM-related
risks.106 The E.U. obligations under the CBP require limiting GM-matters’
movement across its borders and allow such drastic measures as complete
prevention of entry onto its territory.107 Panama, where AAS is to be
grown-out, is a party to the CBP and thus amenable to its obligations.108
The CBP provides a significant counterbalance to the WTO’s free
trade rules but does not stand in direct opposition to its provisions.109
While the United States is not a party to the CBP,110 the CBP provisions
implicitly impact interpretations of the WTO rules.111 Most of the E.U.
members (and for purposes of this Note, Panama) have signed and ratified
agreements protecting biological diversity, while the United States and
Canada have not signed any of such agreements.112
3. The WTO Crop Dispute Stalemate
The differing principles and approaches of the United States and the
European Union regarding GM foods, grounded in diverging cultural and
institutional aspects of risk assessment and management,113 came to light
in the 2003 seeds crisis. The crisis arose when the European Union failed
to process approvals for U.S. export of GM seeds into its territory for
104. See id.
105. See id. at 24 (noting the CBP having a specific effect on trade policy).
106. See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Makane Moïse Mbengue, Trade,
Environment and Biotechnology: On Coexistence and Coherence, in GENETIC
ENGINEERING AND THE WORLD TRADE SYSTEM: WORLD TRADE FORUM, supra note 55, at
205, 209 (discussing the internet-based information system called “Biosafety ClearingHouse” which enables countries to make informed decisions before agreeing to importation
of GM matters).
107. See WALTERS, supra note 90, at 64 (Cartagena Parties are permitted to reject GM
food); Sella-Villa, supra note 13, at 979. In fact, the European Union was a driving force
behind the CBP and most of its members signed it.
108. See SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note
96, at 3 (listing Panama as party to the CBP).
109. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 176. WTO and CBP are not mutually
exclusive; even though the United States is not a CBP member, WTO panelists can
implicitly invoke its provisions when solving trade conflicts between the United States and
the European Union. Id.
110. Id. at 155.
111. Id. at 176 (“The existence of the Protocol can affect the interpretation of WTO
legal provision . . . .”).
112. See SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note
96 (revealing that the United States and Canada are not obligated internationally to protect
biological diversity); see also WALTERS, supra note 90, at 90 (discussing that Argentina,
Australia, Canada, Chile, Uruguay and the United States, the so-called ‘Miami Group,’
strongly oppose Cartagena environmental protection objectives and see them as harmful to
trade).
113. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 33–34.
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several years. This allegedly caused massive financial damage to U.S.
farmers.114 As a result, the United States filed a suit with the WTO for
violation of international agreements.115 In the document filed with the
WTO, the United States reserved the right to retaliate against the European
Union to compensate for the annual value of lost U.S. exports, royalties,
and licensing fees to the European Union from biotech crops.116 These
losses resulted from various E.U. member states’ use of the safeguard
clause117 to block GM crops from their territories.118 The United States
argued that the resulting ban on GM imports was a violation of global trade
rules.119 The WTO ultimately decided not to rule on the issue of GM crop
safety but agreed that the European Union’s undue delay in approvals of
U.S. GM crop imports caused trade disruption.120 The European Union
was encouraged to process the approvals, but the WTO ultimately failed
to rule on the safety of GM crops.121 The United States walked away from
114. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 183 (declaring that the United States
could lose $4 billion in exports).
115. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 14 (stating that the suit took place in
2003 and alleged that E.U. regulations, which allow member states to block the access of
GM seeds to their markets, caused a de facto moratorium on E.U. approvals of those
products).
116. Jonathan Lynn, U.S. Seeks to Retaliate against EU in GMO Case, REUTERS (Jan.
30, 2008, 11:03 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL3043174920080130.
117. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 63 (explaining that the safeguard
provision allows individual member states to restrict or suspend GM seeds or GM animals
from entering into their state).
118. EU Wants to Put GMO Dispute to an End, EURACTIV.COM (July 12, 2010),
http://www.euractiv.com/en/cap/%20EU-wants-GMO-dispute-to-end-news-496059 (“The
plans would allow large-scale commercial planting in pro-GM countries such as Spain, the
Netherlands and the Czech Republic, opening up new markets for major biotech companies,
while at the same time legally endorsing existing GM bans in countries like Italy, Austria
and Hungary.”).
119. U.S., Canada and Argentina Ask for WTO Dispute Settlement over EU's GMO
Policy,
FOOD
AND
DRINK
WEEKLY
(Aug.
23,
2003),
http://www.allbusiness.com/government/business-regulations/629606-1.html
(“Austria, France, Greece, and Italy, have prohibited the importation and marketing of GM
products, even though those products have already been approved for sale in the EU.”).
120. See Strauss, supra note 55, at 786. The Panel focused on the delay rather than the
validity of GM regulations. Id. The European Union itself later made a statement that its
regulatory provisions are not affected by the WTO judgment. Id. It is another question
whether the WTO has the authority to impose legislation changes on it members. Id. See
also POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 21 (detailing the judgment of the WTO).
121. See, e.g., Ince & Mariani, supra note 55, at 17–18 (noting that the WTO did not
discuss whether GM foods were safe, whether the European Union had the right to set their
own standards as to U.S. imports, or whether the approval requirements of the European
Union violated E.U. obligations under the WTO); see POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1,
at 21 (“[T]he panel avoided determining whether the European Union had based a decision
on a risk assessment or whether the assessments showed actual risks or greater risks than for
conventional plant varieties . . . .”); id. at 7 (“[T]he WTO has empowered domestic political
actors . . . with an interest in complying with WTO law, and as a result, has encouraged
regulators on both sides of the Atlantic to operate more transparently, taking into greater
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the 2003 seeds crisis with faster processing of its GM crop import
applications to E.U. member states but no long-term guarantee of a meritbased ruling in the form of changed E.U. laws that would ease future
tensions, like those that may arise from AAS imports into the European
Union.122 While this stark contrast of viewpoints continues to divide the
United States and the European Union,123 the FDA’s approval of AAS for
public consumption in the United States would further exacerbate the
international tensions.124 Salmon is an international commodity and a
“natural resource of the high seas or common heritage of mankind”125 and
is governed by special international instruments such as the Convention
for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean, of which the
United States, Canada, and the European Union are members.126
E. U.S.-E.U. SALMON TRADE STATISTICS AND IMPACT ON WILD
POPULATIONS
There are two important statistical considerations with regard to AAS
approval. First, the United States currently exports 23% of its total $536
million salmon production to the European Union;127 in turn, ABT would
have difficulty selling AAS in the European Union due to their strict GMrelated regulations. Second, wild salmon move freely in oceanic waters,128
and if AAS ever escaped or were maliciously or accidentally released into
the wild, AAS could destroy endangered wild salmon populations.129
account the effects of their actions on third parties.”).
122. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 252–53; see also Strauss, supra note
55, at 804 (stating that the WTO did not rule decisively on any issue significantly affecting
the suit brought by the United States).
123. See generally Ince & Mariani, supra note 55 (speculating that even the WTO
dispute resolution entity will not be able to reconcile the two contrasting approaches without
significant conceptual and philosophical changes).
124. See Layton, supra note 3.
125. See Wen-Chen Shih, Conflicting Jurisdictions over Disputes Arising from the
Application of Trade-Regulated Environmental Measures, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS.
351, 365 (2009) (inferring that migratory fish need regulation by international tribunals that
will have the power to implement effective measures of protection and only common
international efforts can prevent further eradication of endangered fish species).
126. KEITH CIALINO, OFFICE OF INT’L AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
CONCERNING LIVING MARINE RESOURCES OF INTEREST TO NOAA FISHERIES 24 (2010)
(stating that the Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean
obligates the parties to cooperate in using a precautionary approach to “introductions and
transfers including aquaculture impacts and possible use of transgenic salmon.”).
127. Alaska Sea Food Marketing Institute, Salmon Export Timing - The Big Picture,
SALMON MKT. BULLETIN,
Jan.–Feb. 2004,
at 1, 1,
available at
http://www.alaskaseafood.org/fishingprocessing/0204smb.pdf.
128. See The Atlantic Salmon, N. ATLANTIC SALMON CONSERVATION ORG. (last
updated Nov. 14, 2011), www.nasco.int/atlanticsalmon.html.
129. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 38 (warning that the escaped and
integrated salmon could eventually eliminate the wild salmon populations and degrade
larger ecosystems); see also COATES, supra note 6, at 104; Frequently Asked Questions,
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Research shows that just “60 [GM] fish among 60,000 wild fish would
bring [a] species [to] extinction within 40 generations.”130 Further, studies
show that the estimated escape rate of salmon from sea cages [farmed
salmon] is about 1%.131 While ABT ensures that its production method
minimizes the risks of escape by using inland tanks, its intent to sell the
eggs commercially poses far greater risks.132 The Packet does not mention
who will monitor the independent farmers to ensure that they indeed use
inland tanks, located far away from reservoirs, as opposed to the far
cheaper sea cages.
III. ANALYSIS
ABT should not be granted approval at this time because of the FDA’s
lack of environmental expertise on GM animals, the insufficiency of the
legal framework, and the possible disruption of the international salmon
trade. The high impact on international laws, exceptional environmental
risk, and unparalleled precedential value also preclude such approval.
Instead, to prepare for future GM animal approvals and to minimize
chances of WTO involvement, along with precluding environmental
damage, Congress should enact stricter Coordinated Framework review of
labeling laws to facilitate GM animal entry into local and foreign export
markets.
A. FDA’S LACK OF ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERTISE ON GM ANIMALS,
STATUTORY INSUFFICIENCY, AND THE NEED FOR FULL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT LAWS
Until the FDA has more experience in approving GM animals, AAS
should be reviewed by environmental protection bodies that specialize in
the environment. ABT does not guarantee that AAS will not escape,133 but
WILD SALMON CTR. (2004), http://www.wildsalmoncenter.org/about/faq.php (last visited
Nov. 14, 2011) (explaining that farm-bred escapee fish such as salmon or tilapia migrate
thousands of miles and may “colonize and crowd out the native wild populations.”). See
generally Lars P. Hansen & Malcolm L. Windsor, Interactions Between Aquaculture and
Wild Stocks of Atlantic Salmon and Other Diadromous Fish Species: Science and
Management, Challenges and Solutions, 63 ICES J. MARINE SCI. 1159, 1160 (2006)
(“Escaped fish disperse quickly from site of release . . . .”).
130. COATES, supra note 6, at 104.
131. AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28, at 54; see also L.P. Hansen
et al., The Incidence of Escaped Farmed Atlantic Salmon, Salmo salar L., in the Faroese
Fishery and Estimates of Catches of Wild Salmon, 56 ICES J. MARINE SCI. 200, 201 (1999)
(“[L]arge numbers of escaped farmed Atlantic salmon were present in oceanic waters . . .
.”); id. at 203 (“[In some catches] more than 40% of the fish sampled were estimated to be
of farmed origin.”).
132. AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28, at 41 (stating that AAS eggs
will be produced for “commercial release”); see also Heavey, supra note 4 (“[ABT’s CEO]
said [ABT] plans to sell the eggs to inland fish farmers.”).
133. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 131 (“[A]dequate containment
measures appear to be in place . . . to insure a very low probability of escape for all life
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claims that AAS are designed to be sterile and will not be able to survive
and reproduce if they escape into the wild.134 Despite this design
precaution, up to 5% of AAS are not sterile; this raises environmental
concerns. Studies on wild salmon migration show their free movement
within oceanic waters.135 AAS, if released in Panama or Prince Edward
Island, could pose a serious threat to the already endangered wild salmon
populations due to its superiority. AAS grow in half the time of wild
salmon,136 are several times their size, resistant to cold,137 and have a
greater survival ability than that of wild salmon.138 Thus, ABT’s
assessment that there are no likely environmental consequences on foreign
nations and global commons is false, and at minimum, merits independent
assessment and verification.139 The FDA review system regime140 is
flawed and insufficient because it does not require independent
environmental assessment and research. Furthermore, the FDA relies
exclusively on the data provided by ABT to approve AAS indefinitely.141
A heavily invested company is the only provider of assessment and reports
without any re-assessment mechanism. Because of precedential value, the
FDA’s lack of expertise in assessing the environmental impact of GM
animals and an absence of independent research precludes federal approval
at this time. Although AAS’s probability of escape is low, the magnitude
of impact if an escape occurs is overwhelming, thus making FDA review
alone insufficient.142
Further, AAS should not be approved under current law because the
FFDCA statute may, as some critics point out, be outdated and
inadequate.143 First, the statute is designed for drug approval, not approval
stages of salmon present.”) (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 130 (“[I]t is concluded that the likelihood is extremely small that [AAS] will
establish and reproduce if they escape . . . .”).
135. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 38; see also Jamie Doward, GM Food
Battle Moves to Fish as Super-Salmon Nears US Approval, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 25,
2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/sep/26/gm-food-battle-salmon.
136. See Heavey, supra note 4 (“[ABT’s] salmon has a gene to make it grow twice as
fast as natural Atlantic salmon.”).
137. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 65–66, 75.
138. AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28, at 34–35 (noting that AAS
are likely to avoid predation better than wild salmon due to their ability to adjust faster to
the saline environment and swim faster).
139. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 131.
140. See PLAN & VAN DEN EEDE, supra note 89.
141. The E.U. system, on the other hand, grants GM approvals for periods of only ten
years subject to subsequent extensions.
142. See Geiger, supra note 4 (stating that although there is a small risk of escape and
co-mingling, it should not render the GM salmon safe for human consumption and the
environment because the small probability of harm is outweighed by the magnitude of
impact on the environment).
143. See TADLOCK COWAN & GEOFFREY S. BECKER, AGRICULTURAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY: BACKGROUND AND RECENT ISSUES 9 (2010), available at
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of animals intended for human consumption.144 The plain language of
section 201(g)(1)(C) refers to drugs by defining them as “articles (other
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of
man or other animals . . . .”145 Second, the definition within the FFDCA
statute cannot possibly refer to whole living animals intended for human
consumption because the plain meaning of the “other than food” provision
indicates the contrary.146 It appears that the rDNA that AAS contains is a
“drug” because it is intended to affect the structure or function of AAS by
causing AAS to grow faster.147 Would the definition apply to a human who
consumes AAS flesh and the rDNA with it? The Packet does not report
that the consumption of AAS affects the structure or any function of
humans.148 Thus, if rDNA is considered a “drug,” does it stop being a drug
before ingestion by consumers? The statute lacks transparency, introduces
ambiguity, and has never before been used to approve a GM animal
intended for human consumption.
Even if the statute was adequate section 201(v)(2) requires that a new
animal drug must be determined safe “as a result of investigations.”149
Opposing consumer and environmental groups point out, however, that
research is lacking on GM animals to determine safety and warrant their
large scale production and consumption. Indeed, several U.S. senators
have criticized the FDA approval process of GM foods for lack of adequate
review of health and environmental risks150 necessary under the riskbenefit equivalence principle governing the U.S. approval scheme.151 The
senators expressed concerns that “[s]uch a limited review of the first GE
animal for human consumption is wholly inadequate to review potential
public safety concerns associated and recklessly and needlessly endangers
http://infousa.state.gov/economy/industry/docs/73949.pdf (“Critics . . . [have raised]
questions about whether the current laws themselves remain adequate to protect human
health and the environment, particularly as . . . GE applications [have begun to emerge].”).
144. See This Week In FDA History - June 20, 1963, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ThisWeek/ucm117831.htm
(last
updated May 20, 2009) (noting the legislative history of the FFDCA which included the
Kefauver-Harris Amendments that allowed the FDA to more strictly govern the
“manufacture, effectiveness and promotion of drugs.”).
145. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) § 201, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C)
(2006).
146. Id.
147. See Heavey, supra note 4.
148. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 131.
149. FFDCA § 201, 21 U.S.C. § 321(v)(2).
150. Christian Nordqvist, Lawmakers Make Move to Stop Genetically Modified Salmon
Approval,
MEDICAL
NEWS
TODAY
(Sept.
29,
2010),
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/202932.php (noting the letter was signed by
eleven Senators and supported by fifty-two environmental groups, consumer groups,
retailers, food businesses, and commercial and recreational fisheries associations).
151. See generally sources cited supra note 55 (regarding how the United States
analyzes the risks and benefits for GM food).
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consumer health.”152
The recent FDA Guideline for Industry 187 for approval of GM
animals does not mention any updated or alternative statute under which
AAS could possibly be approved. However, it does list groups of animals
currently being developed to which the ABT product might apply.153 A
careful reading of animal groups listed in the Guidance could theoretically
justify regulation of AAS under group (1) “food quality traits,” because
AAS grows twice as fast as farmed salmon, or group (6) “consumer
product.” The Packet, however, does not mention these provisions as a
basis for approval but instead uses the new animal drug statute for AAS
review.154
Even if the existing statutes were adequate, Congress must still enact
full impact assessment laws and impose statutory monitoring and
traceability requirements modeled on the E.U. framework if the United
States wants to be an active competitor in the international GM food trade.
Compatibility with E.U. laws would enable AAS and other GM foods to
be sold overseas. If ABT was obligated to periodically report to the FDA
(or some other agency) and label the product appropriately to ensure
traceability in the AAS derivatives, U.S. and non-U.S. consumers, along
with interest groups, would likely embrace AAS. A new GM animalspecific statute would facilitate trade relations and boost consumer
confidence in both the United States and the European Union.155
In the meantime, AAS could still be introduced to the national and
international consumer markets based on ad-hoc event-specific and
product-specific agreements with the European Union and other nations.156
152. Thomas Corriher, The F.D.A. is Using a Unique G.M.O. Salmon Approval Process
to Bypass U.S. Regulations, THE HEALTH WYZE REP. (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://healthwyze.org/index.php/component/content/article/499-the-fda-is-using-a-uniquegmo-salmon-approval-process-to-bypass-us-regulations.html.
153. See REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS, supra note 11, at 4
(“GE animals currently being developed can be divided into six broad classes based on the
intended purpose of the genetic modification: (1) to enhance production or food quality traits
(e.g., pigs with less environmentally deleterious wastes, faster growing fish); (2) to improve
animal health (e.g., disease resistance); (3) to produce products intended for human
therapeutic use (e.g., pharmaceutical products or tissues for transplantation; these GE
animals are sometimes referred to as ‘biopharm’ animals); (4) to enrich or enhance the
animals’ interactions with humans (e.g., hypo-allergenic pets); (5) to develop animal models
for human diseases (e.g., pigs as models for cardiovascular diseases); and (6) to produce
industrial or consumer products (e.g., fibers for multiple uses).”).
154. See THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 1 (acknowledging that the only
statute the Packet discusses is the “drug” statute). Accordingly, if the FDA concludes that
its statutory authority is insufficient, it should take proactive steps and issue a guidance
request to related agencies of Congress. Id.
155. Since there are no monitoring or traceability requirements in the United States, this
could be an initial step to bring the GM framework for approval closer to the E.U. framework
for approval. Further, because no animal has ever been approved for human consumption,
this change appears to be appropriate.
156. See Thomas Cottier, Genetic Engineering, Trade and Human Rights, in GENETIC
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Perhaps the biotechnology revolution may no longer be stopped,157 and the
only reasonable step is to revamp existing laws by adding GM-favorable
amendments to existing international agreements such as the CBP or to
initiate a new coalition of pro-GM communities and negotiate with the
GM-averse communities such as the European Union.
B. UNIFICATION OF THE SALMON TRADE TO PREVENT WTO
INVOLVEMENT AND FACILITATE CBP COMPLIANCE: LABELING
AAS approval under current laws will perpetuate the history of
international trade disagreements between the United States and the
European Union.158 Additionally, AAS approval under the existing legal
framework will widen the prominent and vast legislative and conceptual
fissure already apparent in the international arena and visible in the U.S.E.U. crop dispute.159 The gap will widen160 because it is reasonable to
anticipate that the European Union will ban any imports of AAS into its
territory, thus depriving the United States of a portion of its exports.161
Reminiscent of the GM crop crisis,162 this could lead to a temporary and
possibly permanent trade freeze and a stalemate, which could bring about
another U.S.-E.U., GM-related dispute under the WTO.
The existing discrepancy is vast because currently in the European
Union, AAS-type applications would have to undergo independent agency
assessment such as the one conducted by the European Food Standards
Agency (EFSA).163 Further, they would need to comply with labeling and
tracing requirements, post-market monitoring measures, full public
disclosure, and separate approval by each E.U. state with an active
ENGINEERING AND THE WORLD TRADE SYSTEM: WORLD TRADE FORUM, supra note 55, at
17, 47–48 (proposing that biotechnology could be addressed in entirely new international
agreements).
157. See Michael Cardwell, Introduction to THE REGULATION OF GENETICALLY
MODIFIED ORGANISMS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES, supra note 13, at 1, 2.
158. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 276–77 (providing that the United
States and the European Union have, historically, not agreed on numerous issues relating to
export-import international trade). For example, when the European Union essentially froze
approvals on the U.S. soybean and maize seed entry into its territory by imposing strict
monitoring, approval and traceability requirements, the United States brought a lawsuit with
the WTO. The United States is in stark contrast to the European Union because U.S. laws
do not require labeling, segregating or monitoring of the crops. Id.; see also Federici, supra
note 13, at 516; Cardwell, supra note 157, at 6.
159. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 181–82.
160. See Strauss, supra note 55, at 780, 807 (providing that U.S. regulations with regard
to GM produce are much less rigorous as compared to the European Union’s regulation on
GM produce).
161. Alaska Sea Food Marketing Institute, supra note 127, at 1 (stating that the United
States exports 23% of its salmon to the European Union).
162. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 182.
163. See WALTERS, supra note 90, at 100 (explaining that the EFSA is an independent
agency that reviews GM applications to ensure food safety consumer protection).
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“safeguard provision.”164 In contrast, in the United States, the FDA would
only require a unilateral risk assessment from ABT165 without any
labeling,166 mandatory monitoring measures, or safeguard withdrawal
provisions. Furthermore, once the FDA allows it on the market, AAS can
be sold in each state regardless of the state’s residents’ opinion of GM
foods.
While it is unreasonable to expect that the United States and the
European Union will reconcile their GM-related laws any time soon, one
viable solution seems to exist which would facilitate GM food and crop
trade and, possibly, AAS imports into the European Union. A compatible
labeling system would increase consumer confidence and the flow of
information and approval transparency. The FDA has already issued
guidance on voluntary labeling which could be used as a model for
mandatory labeling laws.167 Moreover, there is growing pressure to impose
GM-related labeling laws from members of Congress and various public
organizations. Furthermore, individuals,168 and a majority of Americans
would prefer labeling.169
Labeling would also help achieve the WTO’s free trade objectives to
ensure unobstructed trans-boundary movement of GM plants and
animals.170 Because all WTO member countries are obligated to regulate,
produce, classify, transport, and market GM plants and foods in a tradefriendly way,171 mandatory labeling would necessitate that all recipients of
AAS operate under the same labeling principle.
Not pursuing the labeling objective could lead to another WTO
dispute and likely result in a repeat of the 2006 WTO crop crisis. Would
the European Union, with its strict laws that would likely prevent AAS
entry into its territory, be responsible for international trade disruption, or
would the United States’ lenient GM-related approval laws which
essentially prevent the European Union from allowing the entry of AAS in
the first place, be to blame? Regardless of the answer, ambiguity still
exists. Since the WTO’s authority does not reach so far as to impose
regulations on its members, it may only recommend actions for conflicted
164. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text (providing that the safeguard
provision was effectively used by the European Union in the crops crisis).
165. See generally THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 112–14.
166. See generally Strauss, supra note 55, at 780, 784.
167. See Grossman, supra note 13, at 317 (stating that the guidance was issued in 2001);
see also REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS, supra note 11, at 2.
168. See Center for Food Safety, supra note 47.
169. See ROBERT PAARLBERG, STARVED FOR SCIENCE: HOW BIOTECHNOLOGY IS
BEING KEPT OUT OF AFRICA 23 (2008) cited in Federici, supra note 13, at 530 (noting that
94% of Americans polled prefer that their food be labeled for its GM content).
170. See generally Sella-Villa, supra note 13, (discussing labeling as part of a common
customs classification system that would speed up E.U. GMO imports).
171. Id. at 978.
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parties that are designed to help them resolve their dispute.172 While the
WTO arbitration body in the GM crop dispute was able to achieve faster
approvals of U.S. GM crop applications, the European Union retained its
GM-relevant laws.173 It is reasonable to expect that any AAS-related
lawsuit would not result in the WTO imposing mandatory approval of
AAS in Europe. However, proper labeling of AAS, as a precondition of
FDA approval, could minimize the risk of trade disruption and prevent a
lawsuit in the first place. In turn, the fate of AAS on the European market
would be determined by free market principles of customer demand,
instead of administrative reasons of blocked entry.
Even the CBP community, of which the United States is not a
member, would benefit from labeling requirements universally imposed
on AAS, because Panama could avoid violating its Cartagena obligations
to “avoid or minimize . . . potential adverse effects”174 of handling GM
food and animals, when AAS is accepted there for grow-out. Panama, an
intended home for AAS’s grow-out facility,175 would then likely comply
with CBP’s requirements of safer transport and handling of GM products
because each transport batch would presumably be labeled as containing
GM matter. Without the labeling, it remains an open question whether
Panama’s acceptance of transgenic eggs would amount to violations of the
CBP.
Indeed, the benefits of AAS labeling are significant in facilitating
international trade under binding international contracts, especially
because both the WTO and the CBP promote trans-boundary movement
of articles and products.176 The objectives of both the WTO (free trade)
and CBP (preservation of biodiversity) would meet on at least this point.
C. INSUFFICIENCIES OF THE ABT PACKET AND THE EA PRECLUDE
APPROVAL
Even if the FDA possessed environmental expertise and the GMrelevant statute was adequate, the Packet and the EA still do not merit
approval of AAS. The Packet, containing 180 pages of reports,
172. Id. at 974.
173. See Strauss, supra note 55, at 786.
174. Simonetta Zarilli, Biotechnology in the Energy Sector: Some Implications for
Developing Countries, in GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE WORLD TRADE SYSTEM, supra
note 1, at 151, 167.
175. See THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 23. The Packet reports that the
AAS eggs will be produced at the Prince Edward Island, Canada facility, while the fish will
be grown out in Panama facilities. Id.
176. See Sella-Villa, supra note 13, at 978. The WTO and the Protocol are not in direct
opposition: both the WTO and the Protocol promote trans-boundary movements of articles,
including GMO products; however, the Protocol imposes heightened safeguards to protect
biological diversity. The Protocol member countries have thus increased responsibility to
safeguard health and environment. Id.
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assessments, and conclusions, does not warrant FDA approval at this time.
First, although the Packet lists numerous containment measures,177 it does
not provide a guarantee that AAS is adequately contained to prevent
escape from ABT facilities.178 Moreover, ABT intends to license AAS
eggs to third party farmers179 but has not demonstrated any enforcement or
monitoring measures to control their operations. Second, the Packet does
not rule out a possibility that AAS is capable of reproduction in the wild.180
Third, the Packet admits there is no scientific data to preclude AAS’s
capability of surviving in the wild.181 In addition, although the corporation
spent sixty million dollars on research, it used only 144 market-sized
salmon to conduct its assessments.182 Further, the Packet contains only one
sentence concluding that international consequences are not likely.183
While the Packet discloses that AAS has been modified with the Chinook
salmon growth hormone and the ocean pout antifreeze protein, and that
they contain higher level of allergens, there is no mention of any
comparable research.184 Instead, ABT concludes that there are no observed
negative health consequences and that the heightened allergenicity levels
are not of public concern because consumers already allergic to salmon
will stay away from AAS as well.185
Further, the EA does not warrant approval as escapees will have high
impact on wild salmon if they interbreed. First, salmon are known to alter
genetically when they change environments.186 Second, AAS would outcompete wild salmon for food187 since 25% size advantage is enough to
gain superiority,188 and AAS is several times as large as wild salmon.
Finally, AAS sterility is not guaranteed—up to 5% may not be sterile.189
177. See AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28, at 63.
178. See THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 131 (“[A]dequate containment
measures appear to be in place . . . to insure a very low probability of escape for all life
stages of salmon present.”) (emphasis added).
179. See AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28, at 41; Heavey, supra note
4; Geiger, supra note 4.
180. See THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 130 (“[I]t is concluded that the
likelihood is extremely small that AquAdvantage Salmon will establish and reproduce if
they escape . . . .”).
181. Id. at 129 (“There are no specific study data addressing [the issue of AAS survival
in nature] . . . .”).
182. Id. at 78–79 (“A total of 144 market-sized . . . Atlantic salmon were included in
the study . . . . [T]issue samples from a total of 73 salmon were analyzed . . . .”).
183. See id. at 131 (“[T]here are no likely consequences . . . on the US, any foreign
nations not participating in the action, or the global commons [as a result of applicable
reproductive and geographic/geophysical confinement].”).
184. Id. at 65.
185. Id. at 75.
186. See AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28, at 21.
187. See id. at 35.
188. Id.
189. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 115 (noting that this could pose a
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Although survival likelihood is “extremely small,”190 it is still possible.
This data does not prove that AAS is not a threat to the wild salmon
population.
Thus, the conclusions presented in both reports do not qualify AAS
for FDA approval, even under the more lenient U.S. risk-benefit
equivalence scheme.191 Although there would be a benefit in faster growth
presumably lowering the price of salmon, the risks do not outweigh the
costs. The lack of conclusive research on the health impact of AAS, the
high allergenicity, and the catastrophic and irreversible environmental
consequences in case of escape or malicious release, preclude approval by
the FDA. Yet, this does not mean that AAS could never be approved. The
FDA should demand research on a larger sample of AAS and more
conclusive research on the growth hormone consumption impact on
humans, require placement of emergency measures in case the
containment measures fail,192 and require a better than 5% sterility ratio.
The FDA could also set up its own independent research body to evaluate
the scientific conclusions submitted in the application.193 Further, because
AAS is a case of first instance, the FDA could require a “disabling”
mutation to preclude survival in nature.194 In the long run, the FDA should
issue a formal request to Congress for legislative reform that would
provide a more detailed framework for future approvals of GM animals in
general.195
D. POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS: PANAMA
AAS approval by the FDA, in the United States, may indirectly lead
risk of reproduction with the wild salmon if the GM salmon ever became integrated into the
wild).
190. Id. at 130.
191. See generally Sella-Villa, supra note 13, (comparing U.S. and E.U. approaches to
risks regarding GMOs).
192. See generally THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 116. Aqua Bounty
reports that “The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Biotechnology Research
Advisory Committee . . . has prepared performance standards for safely conducting research
with genetically modified fish” and that those standards do not “require, or even
recommend, specific . . . containment measures.” Id.
193. EFSA, an independent body in the European Union, works exceptionally well:
assessment results are comparable against one another, the risk of manipulation by
applicants becomes minimal and the public has no reason to believe that research is biased
or otherwise inadequate. See Council Regulation 178/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 31) (establishing
EFSA). The creation of a similar body under the U.S. framework would be a revolutionary
step.
194. See WALTERS, supra note 90, at 11 (noting that science permits injecting genes
with “disabling mutations [that prevent] grow[ing] outside of the controlled environment of
a laboratory test tube”).
195. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 274 (explaining that recent
biotechnology events might “call into question the adequacy of the Coordinated Framework
to deal with new and emerging technologies”).
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to international law violations by Panama. As ABT plans to produce AAS
eggs in Canada and grow the fish out in Panama,196 transport between these
facilities raises international law concerns given Panama’s membership in
the CBP.197 Given that ABT does not guarantee 100% confinement of the
AAS,198 any release or escape during transport in Panama’s territory that
injures or contaminates the biodiversity of another country could involve
the United States in a potential liability dispute as an indirect cause of
contamination.199 The United States is not bound by the CBP,200 but ABT’s
plans to grow AAS in Panama are adverse to Panama’s obligation to
protect biodiversity within its territory. Thus, in the event that containment
fails, the FDA approval will have an international impact on natural
salmon resources in the Atlantic. AAS’s free movement in oceanic waters
could cause a domino effect in other nations by destroying their already
dwindling wild salmon populations.
E. WILD SALMON PRESERVATION, WILD SALMON TRADE, AND GENERAL
PRECEDENTIAL IMPACT OF THE APPROVAL
AAS could eradicate wild salmon populations because ABT’s less
than 100% effective containment measures combined with AAS’s
imperfect sterility rate201 could cause AAS integration into wild
populations202 that move freely within oceanic waters.203 Escaped or
released AAS could impact both wild salmon trade worldwide and
environmental preservation efforts that protect wild salmon. Under WTO
agreements,204 the United States is obligated not to cause unnecessary
196. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 65.
197. See SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note
96; see also POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 155.
198. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 120–32.
199. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 154 (explaining that the United States
never ratified the CBP and is therefore not bound by its provisions, although it might be
liable under some other international agreements).
200. See SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note
96.
201. See THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 115, 127.
202. See id. at 116 (acknowledging that their containment measures are not 100%
effective and do not preclude either the possibility of salmon escaping from its breeding
grounds or “survival and possibly establishment” of the fish in the adjacent natural waters).
Further, ABT reports that “there are no specific study data” addressing the issue of survival
but that it “conservatively assumed that older life stages . . . would survive if they escaped
containment in [Prince Edward Island, Canada].” Id. at 129–30.
203. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 129; see also COATES, supra note 6,
at 104 (“[J]ust 60 genetically engineered fish among 60,000 wild fish would bring species
extinction within 40 generations.”); POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 274; Doward,
supra note 135.
204. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, vol. 27 (1994),
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/17-tbt.pdf; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
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obstacles to trade, and AAS comingling with wild salmon could effectively
eradicate non-GM salmon trade altogether, as well as trigger international
litigation. A dispute over genetic contamination of wild salmon caught and
internationally traded would likely be brought before the WTO Dispute
Settlement Unit. This would be similar to the 2003 GM seeds case which
was resolved in favor of the United States.205 However, because the AAS
dispute would stem from losses to a multitude of fishing industries, it is
impossible to speculate that the resolution would in any way resemble the
GM seed case or cause any changes to the E.U. GM-related approval
system.206 In the crop dispute, the WTO Panel did not rule against the E.U.
endorsed “precautionary principle,”207 but only focused on undue delays.
It is reasonable to speculate that a possible AAS dispute would bring
similarly inconclusive results. It is outside the scope of this Note to discuss
any possible damage claims that the wronged states and communities
would then bring.
In addition, E.U. GM-related laws,208 designed to maintain control
over which GM organisms enter the environment, would be redundant as
soon as AAS would become part of the natural ecosystem, and all salmon
caught in E.U. water territory would have to be presumed GM-tainted.
Although each European state may independently ban import of GM
products into its territory,209 countries such as Ireland,210 where wild
salmon are still fished, would immediately be deprived of their refusal
right to have GM salmon as part of their diets as the AAS could simply
migrate into Ireland’s waters.
Finally, there is no other genetically modified animal that has
of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299,
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal e/27-trips.pdf; General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, October 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
205. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 187.
206. See id. (explaining that the WTO Panel’s opinion ruled the E.U. delays in GMO
crop seed approvals as ‘not inconsistent’ with the relevant treaties, criticized E.U. delays in
approvals rather than the approval system, and did not rule on whether biotech products are
safe in general or whether the E.U. regulations are adequate).
207. See, e.g., Zarilli, supra note 1, at 7 (“For countries like the EU, that have adopted
a ‘no-risk’ approach, the main preoccupation is to establish strict import measures that
would guarantee that the chosen high level of health and environmental protection is indeed
achieved.”).
208. See Directive 2001/18/EC, supra note 92, (imposing mandatory tracing and
monitoring requirements for deliberate releases of GMOs and mandatory public information
disclosures).
209. The “safeguard provision” permits restricting or prohibiting a GM organism when
new or additional scientific knowledge raises concern as to that GMO’s safety for human
health and environment. Id. at art. 23.
210. See European Commission Orders Ireland to Protect Wild Atlantic Salmon,
FINFACTS
(July
3,
2006),
http://www.finfacts.com/irelandbusinessnews/publish/article_10006443.shtml.
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previously been approved for public consumption,211 and the FDA’s
approval of AAS would be a worldwide breakthrough paving the way for
other corporations to apply for other GM animal-related FDA licensing.212
The approval would initiate a new era in animal production. The GM plant
market started slowly but became so prevalent that it achieved a point of
no return as GM plants are now ubiquitously present and integral to almost
all agricultural markets.213 Just as the first GM plant was first approved in
the United States for public consumption in 1996 leading to, in 2004, an
estimated “global GM crop area [of] 81 million hectares, cultivated by 8.25
million farmers in 17 countries,”214 the FDA approval of AAS will trigger
developments that are inestimable and dangerous. While GM proponents
argue that the FDA had already approved GM animals when it reviewed
GloFish, the decorative fish,215 this precedent should not be used for
approving an animal that has an impact on the health of millions and on
ecosystems across the world.
IV. CONCLUSION
The revolutionary nature and historic proportions of the FDA AAS
review is a perfect opportunity for reassessment of the U.S. GM-related
laws and for considering a possible change to the U.S. GM-related
legislative regime. The FDA should not approve AAS at this time because
the approval would exacerbate the historic GM trade conflict between the
United States and the European Union, interfere with international
biodiversity agreements, and endanger wild salmon populations.
Instead, the controversy should trigger new comprehensive
legislation with respect to GM animal approvals in the United States as
well as verifiable assessment, monitoring procedures, and labeling
requirements. In light of prevalent and persistent consumer and
environmental group protests, the FDA should seek resolutions with
Congress as the new GM animal or GM food product issue is likely to
become more prevalent in the future and may emerge in the context of
international trade relations with other countries.
211. See Layton, supra note 3 (“Scientists at the University of Guelph in Ontario,
Canada, have asked the FDA to approve their ‘Enviropig,’ a hog genetically altered to
produce environmentally friendly manure. Hematech of Sioux Falls, S.D., is developing
genetically modified cows that are resistant to mad cow disease.”).
212. Heavey, supra note 4 (noting that ABT itself announced it will seek approval for
using the same GM technology for trout and tilapia to market the eggs to fish farmers).
213. See id.
214. Zarilli, supra note 1, at 3.
215. See FDA Statement Regarding GloFish, FDA (Dec. 9, 2003),
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/GeneticEngineering/
GeneticallyEngineeredAnimals/ucm161437.htm (explaining that the FDA will not regulate
the GloFish since they are not used for food and pose no threat to the environment).
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